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Abstract
James Ronald Smerbeck, “Perceived Threat, In-group Insularity, and Anti-Immigrant
Policy Support”
(Under the Direction of Donald Searing)
There has recently been a sharp increase in support for anti-immigrant policies in
Europe. This paper tests whether this increase can be explained by an in-group insularity
(rooted in Social Identity Theory) felt by traditional natives toward immigrants, or
whether it acts in tandem with perceived economic and demographic threat (rooted in
Realistic Group Conflict Theory). I ran a cross-sectional OLS model that incorporated
both in-group insularity and perceived threat across 14 European countries individually,
and then a cross-national analysis controlling for state-level factors. The results
demonstrated that in-group insularity is more powerful in explaining support for anti-
immigrant policies than perceived threat.
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Introduction
Immigration is one of the most divisive and controversial issues facing Europe
today. While there has been immigration from outside the continent since the 1960s, the
types of immigrants have recently changed from skilled workers alleviating labor
shortages in many countries to immigrants either seeking asylum or entering Europe
illegally. As the nature of immigration has changed, public opposition toward
immigration has increased. In the 1960s many Europeans believed that too many
immigrants were entering Europe. But by the late 1990s and early 2000s, these concerns
over immigration were leading to support for anti-immigrant parties and policies. It is
this shift in public opinion, at least in part, that has resulted in many governments—even
those without anti-immigrant parties in coalition—advocating restrictions on immigration
and on job opportunities for immigrants in efforts to please their constituents. To
understand the politics surrounding immigration, it is important to determine the
motivations behind the increasing demands of traditional nationals for restrictions on
immigration.1 In this paper, I will examine two potential underlying causes: insularity of
traditional nationals and perceived economic and demographic threat.
The in-group insularity explanation is explained by social identity theory, a theory
based on the premise that people label themselves and others to achieve a sense of
belonging and unity (Tajfel and Turner 1979). This was a successful strategy for
1 I define traditional nationals as residents of a country whose family’s residency predates World War II.
This is the most accurate term, as some second and third-generation immigrants—many of whom are
citizens—are still victims of discrimination and are not treated as equals in their country.
2generating strong in-group identities among traditional nationals, but made conditions
ripe for viewing groups from a different country, religious tradition or way of life as
interlopers. When the immigrants of the 1960s and 1970s settled, they were treated with
suspicion and hostility, despite their economic necessity as guest workers (Gurr and Huff
1994). A potential reason for this cold reception is that these immigrants simply did not
fit in with traditional nationals’ conceptions of their nation-states, despite the de-
legitimization of nationalism in post-war Europe (Joppke 1998).
But by itself, this in-group insularity and lack of openness toward immigrants is
not likely to drive traditional nationals to strongly support anti-immigrant policies or
parties, according to Anthony Marx (2003), who suggests that such social psychological
mechanisms drawn from social identity theory are more likely to be necessary but not
sufficient causes for collective action and nationalist mobilization (Marx 2003).2 For
example, in 1966, eighty-one percent of Germans already believed that there were too
many foreigners entering the country, despite the labor shortage (Gurr and Huff 1994).
However, German citizens did not elect a party that supported anti-immigrant policies
until 1983 (Conradt 2001).3 Is there another explanatory factor that would combine with
traditional nationals’ insularity to push public opinion toward anti-immigrant policies?
Some observe suggest that German policy changed in response not only to increased
immigration but also to poor economic conditions in the early 1980s.4 This result
2 Marx’s work was based on social identity theory, which is designed to be applicable across time periods.
3 The center-right Christian Democratic Union/Free Democratic Party coalition offered to refund the
pensions of guest workers if they agreed to return to their country (Gurr and Huff 1994).
4 This change in policy reflected German public opinion; a majority of respondents believed guest workers
needed to leave the country when jobs were tight (Hoskin 1985).
3presents the possibility that perceived economic and demographic threats may be the
additional causal factors I am seeking for my general theory.
This economic and demographic threat explanation is suggested by realistic group
conflict theory. The theory states that group conflict is likely when opposing groups
share finite resources, and one group perceives the other as threatening to obtain a
disproportionate share of those resources (Sherif and Sherif 1969). In contemporary
Europe, the finite resources are jobs and welfare provisions. During periods of economic
stagnation and high unemployment, anxious traditional nationals may come to believe
that immigrants are taking away “their” jobs. In Austria, for example, the government
rapidly privatized many state-owned industries during the 1990s (Bock-Schappelwein
2005). This caused both a sharp spike in unemployment and apparently rising resentment
toward foreigners. The far-right, anti-immigrant Freedom Party received an astonishing
27 percent of the vote in the 1999 elections and entered into coalition (Luther 2001). At
the same time, due to their generally lower economic status, immigrants may become
vulnerable to anxiety-driven accusations that they receive a disproportionate share of
welfare benefits. This charge is also realistic because a higher percentage of immigrants
qualify for means-tested welfare provisions than do traditional nationals, due to
immigrants generally being of lower socioeconomic status.
While there are many articles devoted to testing social identity theory and realistic
group conflict theory by themselves (Hogg et al 1995, Hogg 2001, Sherif 1966, Sherif
and Sherif 1969, Bobo and Hutchings 1996) and testing the two against each other (Bobo
1983, Insko et al 1992), there has been little research in political science examining their
4potential complementarities and seeking to integrate the two theories.5 The
aforementioned success of the Freedom Party and the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the
Netherlands makes it important to study the issue currently. This is what I do in this
paper. Using the European Values Survey (EVS), I investigate the strength of insularity
among traditional nationals. And I also investigate whether this insularity, lack of
openness to foreigners, and subsequent negative bias, when combined with perceived
economic and demographic threat, increases support for immigration restrictions.
It is also important to test whether the experience of Germany—where it
apparently took poor economic conditions to bring to power parties advocating anti-
immigrant policies—is indicative of other countries. I will test my basic hypothesis
across fourteen European countries. The countries chosen and reasons for being chosen
will be discussed in the next section.
Although there has been growing support for both anti-immigrant parties and
policies over the last 10 years, I have chosen to focus my investigation on support for
policies as the dependent variable rather than parties. There are many issues a voter
considers when deciding to support a party in an election, while support for policies is a
reflection of what traditional nationals would want their government to do on
immigration, regardless of which party is in power. For my purposes, this gives opinions
on policies greater internal validity. Thus, the dependent variable will be an ordinal
measure of a respondent’s support for immigration restrictions.
The next section will present the relevant literature on social identity theory, and I
will interpret it in light of the legacies of European liberalism, specifically the ideal of
5 Insko et al (1992) demonstrated how the two theories can explain different parts of the same problem, but
the theories were not examined as complementary. It was also in the field of social psychology.
5tolerance—a hallmark of western political thought since John Locke—and reactions
toward immigrants. This will provide a contemporary social psychological context to the
insularity felt by traditional nationals about their countries and why they view immigrants
as threatening their conception of the nation-state. I will then turn to a description of the
data, including which countries were chosen and why, how the composite dependent
variable was constructed, and how each of the key predictors are hypothesized to affect
the dependent variable. Finally, I will present and discuss the OLS regression analyses
and conclude with a brief discussion on where scholars should concentrate future
research.
Theory
Social Psychological Bases and Application to Contemporary Europe
Although first presented in social psychology, the three main stages of creating
intergroup discrimination are applicable to the insularity felt by many traditional
nationals about the nation-state and why this insularity may result in negative bias and a
lack of openness toward immigrants. Categorization, the first stage, happened when
rulers of states classified certain people and groups as members of the nation—a
collective in-group—and other groups as not being members (Marx 2003). The state,
using the rule of law, attempted to embed in-groups and out-groups within the country’s
legal framework, with their hope in doing so that the in-group would support the state and
help the state consolidate its own power (Appiah 2005). An example of this was the
relative ease with which ethnic Germans were able to obtain citizenship in West
Germany, while strict citizenship regulations remained in place for non-Germans (Hoskin
1985).
6Identification, the second stage, is the process by which individuals categorize
themselves as part of an in-group and identify against an out-group. This is done because
in-group members (traditional nationals) have a desire to see themselves in a positive
light, which in turn produces negative bias against an out-group (immigrants), because
traditional nationals view themselves as better (Brown 2000). For instance, many
traditional nationals view the better jobs available as being reserved for them, because
they view themselves as being true members of the nation-state, while immigrants should
primarily be doing lower-status jobs, because they are not viewed as equal members
(Hoskin 1985). Identification also increases the insularity and subsequent out-group bias
of traditional nationals, because they are less likely to perceive a common fate with
immigrants and are thus less willing to form with them a new, larger in-group. This
increases insularity of traditional nationals and maintains lack of openness toward
immigrants. (Brown 2000).
The third stage is comparison, where members of the in-group stigmatized the
out-groups, forcing them to the margins of society or physically out of the country.
There has been evidence that respondents who have stronger in-group identification will
more readily display prejudice and hostility toward out-group members than those who
possess weaker identifications (Brown 2000). The justification was that these groups
were not a part of the true nation, so they should not be accorded the same rights and
privileges. The race riots that occurred in the Paris suburbs in late 2005 were an example
of the societal marginalization felt by non-traditional nationals (Ossman and Terrio
2006). 
7The recent influx of immigrants onto the European continent is very problematic
from a social and psychological perspective. In contemporary Europe, otherwise-
unpopular governments can use nationalist sentiments and portrayals of immigrants as
not belonging in the country to maintain a stronghold on power during elections. In turn,
these expressed sentiments can increase insularity and lack of openness towards out-
groups. The two areas in which the effect is strongest are culture and “race.”
Many of the immigrants to Europe are from the Middle East and North Africa
(Peach and Glebe 1995, Garson and Loizillon 2003). These immigrants are stigmatized
for their Islamic faith and culture. Many Europeans are suspicious of the practices that
Muslim immigrants have brought to the European continent, and traditional nationals are
reluctant to allow them to continue these practices while living in Europe. Traditional
nationals, especially those in the left and center politically, want immigrants to adopt the
secular, post-materialist culture that is now pervasive in Europe (Inglehart and Abramson
1994).6 The most famous example is the headscarf controversy in France, in which
French authorities sought to prohibit the wearing of religious symbols in public schools
(Judge 2004).
The second area of stigmatization—race—may carry a unique power in Europe.
Race is a powerful stigmatizing factor because it is the difference between groups that is
most readily apparent (Oakes et al 1994). The belief in the unique stigmatizing power of
race has, however, not been universally accepted. Research in Italy found that prejudice
toward non-white immigrants was deeply ingrained, as Central Africans, who are mainly
black, were more likely to be perceived as inferior by nature. However, there was a
6 Although prominent far-right politicians such as Jean Marie Le Pen in France and Joerg Haider in Austria
appeal to materialist sentiments in efforts to win support.
8higher level of overall prejudice and negative feelings toward Central and Eastern
Europeans (Sniderman et al 2002).
This stigmatization and push for anti-immigrant policies blocks the growth of a
culture of tolerance toward immigrants. The liberal ideal of tolerance suggests that
different values and ways of life should at least be endured and at best, be met with open-
mindedness and respect (Walzer 1997, Searing et al 2005). However, it is not clear how
well the ideal of open-mindedness and respect works in Europe’s traditional nation-states,
most of which have only begun to see themselves as multicultural immigrant societies, if
they have at all. Brewer (1999) argues that societies that have fewer cross-cutting
divisions may be more prone to out-group antagonism. This is a potential explanation for
the insularity and reluctance of many Europeans, especially Western Europeans, to view
immigrants as equals—they have been traditionally more homogeneous societies than
have countries such as the United States and Canada. Some have proposed that the more
modest goal of enduring out-groups while encouraging their conformity to established
norms is the most that can realistically be expected. However, the headscarf
controversies in France and Germany demonstrates a lack of even endurance that
traditional nationals are willing to display toward immigrants.7 This insularity and lack
of openness to immigrants threatens the Enlightenment liberalism that these European
states are at least partially founded upon.
By itself, however, such insularity displayed by traditional nationals appears to be
a necessary but not sufficient condition for supporting anti-immigrant policies (Marx
2003). Christian Joppke writes that while guest workers were always received coolly by
7 In addition to the French case, in several German Landers school teachers are prohibited from wearing
headscarves as well (von Campenhausen 2004).
9traditional nationals, there was never a push for the government to repatriate these
workers (Joppke 301). It is possible that traditional nationals’ insularity and lack of
openness toward immigrants needs to be called into action by a perceived threat or threats
that can generate sufficient support for anti-immigrant policies in the political arena.
Donald Kinder and David Sears suggest that two distinct types of racism have
replaced traditional racism. The first sees members of out-groups as a symbolic threat
simply because their permanent residence in the in-group’s community arouses negative
sentiments and opposition, as out-group members are not perceived as true members of
the nation-state. I incorporate this in the social identity part of the model. The second is
perceived economic and demographic threat; the feeling that the out-group’s continued
existence within the in-group’s community will eventually have negative economic
consequences for the in-group, most notably a lower standard of living (Kinder and Sears
1978; Quillian 1995). I hypothesize perceived threat in my model’s treatment of realistic
group conflict theory.
Realistic group conflict theory posits that there will be intergroup competition
when one group (traditional nationals) perceives another group (immigrants) as receiving
disproportionate shares of resources. Unlike social identity theory, realistic group
conflict theory does not assume any symbolic-based predisposition against members of
the out-group entering (Monroe et al 2000). Rather, it is the perceived economic threat of
competition for jobs and welfare benefits, along with the demographic threat of an
increased out-group as a proportion of the population that would be prompting support
for anti-immigrant policies.
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With respect to job security, there is a fear among traditional nationals that
immigrants will take away lesser-skilled jobs because they will be willing to work for
lower wages. While traditionally immigrants have either entered legally as guest workers
or as asylum seekers, the recent surge of illegal immigration has only heightened this fear
by increasing the size of the out-group (Garson and Loizillon 2003). The increasing
number of illegal immigrants seeking work also provides companies with an incentive to
pay lower wages and have worse working conditions, as illegal immigrants do not have
the legal recourse against substandard wages and working conditions that the above-
mentioned two groups do (Borjas 1994, Bradley et al 2003). Either of these scenarios has
the potential to cause an increase in unemployment or a depression of wages in Europe,
both among traditional nationals and overall.
These are acute concerns in many European countries, with their budgets
constrained by the European Union (EU) Stability and Growth Pact. With many
countries having deficits approaching or exceeding the 3.5% of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) deficit cap, they do not have the budget flexibility to absorb unskilled workers
into both welfare benefits and Active Labor Market Policy programs. This could result in
a reduction in services or an increase in taxes for in-group members—how Kinder and
Sears conceptualized “threats to the good life” (Kinder and Sears 1978). This could lead
to consternation among skilled workers and the middle and upper classes, even though
there is not the same economic threat as there is for unskilled or semi-skilled workers.
This fear of reduction in job security and welfare provisions has multiple
consequences, both social psychological and political. First, there is a tendency to
homogenize out-group members when there is a competition of resources—that is, once
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in-group members perceive certain out-group members as threatening a disproportionate
share of resources, they will view all out-group members as threatening to do so, even if
in-group members did not view other members of the out-group as an economic threat
initially. Thus, immigrants who are in the country legally as guest workers may be
perceived as just as much of an economic threat as illegal immigrants or asylum seekers,
even though traditional nationals may not have initially viewed guest workers as an
economic threat (Jackson 1993).
The second implication follows closely off the first. There exists the possibility
that perceived threat pushes in-group members who otherwise have positive views of the
out-group toward supporting policies that would hurt the out-group (Smith 1981, Bobo
1983, Kluegel and Smith 1983). This view has been challenged with respect to white
attitudes toward black equality in the United States for lack of evidence (Sears et al 1979,
Kinder and Rhodebeck 1982). Given the possibility that immigrants in Europe may be
perceived in ways similar to racial minorities in the United States (Pettigrew 1998), it is
important to test whether a perceived threat will push otherwise tolerant Europeans
toward supporting anti-immigrant policies.
Third, there is a tendency to stereotype and stigmatize out-group members in an
effort to gain maximum resources (Sherif 1967). This is especially true during times of
economic downturn or resource scarcity. When there are multiple groups competing for
jobs and resources in a tough economic environment, leaders need an out-group to turn
in-group resentment toward the out-group and away from the government for not doing
enough to combat the adverse economic conditions. In many cases, the tough economic
conditions have led to out-groups (e.g. Jews in Weimar Germany, African-Americans in
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the Reconstruction South) being perceived as security and cultural threats, even though
the root cause of in-group unease was economic (Monroe et al 2000). It is possible that
traditional nationals may be more willing to support anti-immigrant policies when they
perceive an acute threat to their safety in addition to a perhaps more abstract threat of
them taking their jobs, rather than the latter threat by itself.
Fourth, and most importantly for the purposes of this paper, is that the perceived
threat by traditional nationals has the potential to re-align the political landscape of
Europe. Traditionally, anti-immigration platforms have been utilized almost exclusively
by right-wing groups, with the premise that immigration would destroy national identity
and the “way of life” of the dominant nationality. However, difficult economic times in
many European countries has made organized labor and citizens who would otherwise be
more left-leaning more sympathetic to concerns that increasing immigration will
contribute to loss of jobs and social benefits among traditional nationals (Sniderman et al
2002; Ireland 2007; Gradstein and Schiff 2005). 
Whereas most studies have chosen to investigate social identity theory and
realistic group conflict theory either as separate phenomena or to test them in opposition
to each other (cited above), I argue that in explaining the tensions over immigration in
Europe the theories may be best approached as complementary. Strong national
identities (hypothesized by social identity theory) created an insular culture and lack of
openness toward immigrants, and when a perceived economic or demographic threat is
added (hypothesized by realistic group conflict theory), this lack of openness should
transform into outright support for anti-immigrant policies by traditional nationals.
Countries Chosen
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Thus far, I have presented a general picture on the present immigration situation
across Europe. However, there is wide variation across European countries in the
construction of national identities, their lack of openness toward relevant out-groups, and
economic situations. Thus, a simple “on average” continent-wide analysis of the
relationship between attitudes toward immigrants, perceived economic threat, and policy
preferences would be less informative than would be a comparison of these factors across
the fourteen European countries being studied. Many European countries differ from one
another in a particular area mentioned above but are similar in other areas. Thus, a cross-
national comparison will help to determine whether these differences are influential in
differences on support for anti-immigrant policies.
These fourteen countries were chosen both to provide representativeness of the
geographic areas, different populations, and economic situations in Europe—the latter
two falling under perceived economic and demographic threat. They were also chosen
based on similarities and differences on strength of identity—in-group insularity and lack
of openness toward immigrants. Based on these criteria and for ease of analysis, I
divided the fourteen countries into three groups.
The first group is comprised of the five large Western European democracies of
Great Britain,8 France, Germany, Spain and Italy. These five large countries comprise
over half of the population and GDP of the EU (Eurostat 2006, CIA 2007). They are also
the most popular destination countries for immigrants. However, they also differ based
on the criteria outlined above.
8 The survey was asked to Northern Ireland independently of the British Isle, so the results reflect only
those respondents from England, Scotland and Wales.
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As stated above, it is necessary to determine whether Germany is indicative or
exceptional. Also, France and Great Britain were chosen because they have the highest
and third-highest concentrations of immigrants in Europe, respectively. However,
France’s recent race riots may be indicative of greater insularity by traditional nationals
(and thus, more out-group marginalization) than in Great Britain, which in turn may
translate into higher levels of support for immigration restrictions.
Spain and Italy were chosen because they are both Southern European countries
with rapidly-growing immigrant populations (Migration Policy Institute 2006) and both
countries recently changed their formerly liberal immigration policies to more restrictive
ones. However, Spain has pursued a much more aggressive immigration policy than has
Italy, and the government has made it clear that Spain is not a country of immigration
(Al-Jazeera 2007). It is important to determine whether differences in policies of these
countries reflect differences in public opinion.
The second group is five smaller Western European democracies. They were
chosen in order to provide a representative picture of smaller Western European
countries. As stated above, these choices were made based on similarities and
differences in in-group insularity and openness toward foreigners, along with similarities
and differences in perceived economic and demographic threat. Finland was the
Scandinavian country for which data was available, and due to its dynamic economy and
low immigrant populations, the country should be lower on perceived economic and
demographic threat. At the time of the survey (1999-2000) Ireland was enjoying great
prosperity, with standards of living rising rapidly (Hill et al 2005). Thus, perceived threat
should be low in both countries.
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Austria and the Netherlands were chosen because each has had anti-immigrant
parties enjoy large success in elections over the past ten years, and the parties have
declared that their countries are not ones of immigration—a clear statement of in-group
insularity. I seek to determine whether the determinants of widespread mainstream
support for immigration restrictions in the two countries have the same causes.
Belgium, unlike most of the other countries discussed, does not have a unified
conception of the nation. Belgians who held strong regional, rather than national
identities, exhibited more insularity and negative bias toward foreigners (Maddens,
Billiet, and Beerten 2000).9 I hope to determine whether the strong regional identities
held by many citizens translate into a higher level of overall support for immigration
restrictions.
The third group is four post-communist Central and Eastern European countries.
The Czech Republic represents the most Western of the post-communist countries. It
also has the most generous welfare state and is the second-richest by GDP per capita of
the countries. Because of these factors, Czechs may perceive an economic threat (both to
jobs and welfare provisions) that would not necessarily be shared by the other post-
communist countries. Poland is the largest in population of the post-communist states in
the EU and has traditionally been a proud, homogeneous nation centered on Roman
Catholicism. Poles should exhibit greater insularity and lack of openness than other post-
communist countries.
Bulgaria was chosen to represent both the most recent round of accession and the
EU’s southeastern border. It is also the poorest of the 12 new countries and has a long
9 Although this effect was much stronger in Flanders than in Wallonia.
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history of discrimination against its Turkish minority. Bulgarian respondents should be
among the strongest in both in-group insularity and perceived threat.
Croatia was chosen to represent the Balkan region. It is also unique because it has
historically had a strong national identity defined by superiority toward out-groups,
defined first by being distinct from the rest of Yugoslavia and later as being Roman
Catholic and not Serb. Unlike many other countries, Croatia experienced a nationalist
resurgence relatively recently (in the early 1990s). Its respondents should score higher in
the insularity part of the model.
The different histories of national insularity and unfavorable bias against those
who were not traditional nationals, along with the different demographic and economic
circumstances of the fourteen countries surveyed provide considerable variation, so that
conclusions can be reasonably drawn about the nature of support for anti-immigrant
policies. I will now turn to the OLS model, a description of the dependent variable, and
the hypothesized effects of each key predictor on the variable.
Data and Models
The data for the study were taken from the fourth wave of the World Values
Survey/European Values Survey (WVS/EVS), conducted by the Inter-University
Consortium on Political Science Research (ICPSR) under the auspices of Ronald
Inglehart at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor from 1999 until 2002. The
interviews were face-to-face and respondents also completed extensive questionnaires.
In order to ensure a sufficient sample size from each country being studied, no fewer than
1,000 respondents were interviewed in any country and as many as 2,000 were
interviewed in some. The questions varied somewhat across nations and within them.
Nonetheless, the scope of the questionnaires and the breadth of respondents in each
17
country make the WVS/EVS arguably the most exhaustive survey research that is done
on Europe. 10
As stated before, the primary goal of the paper is to determine whether adding
predictors assessing economic or demographic threat to those measuring in-group
insularity—the comprehensive model—will provide more leverage in explaining support
for anti-immigrant policies. Thus, there should be a significant increase in the r-squared
values when the comprehensive model is run compared with the in-group insularity only
model.11
The dependent variable is designed to capture a respondent’s preference on the
extent to how liberal or restrictive a country’s immigration policy should be—arguably
the most basic anti-immigrant policy preference. While I understand that I lack
components that may explain other areas of anti-immigrant sentiment (e.g. forced
assimilation and preferences for jobs), a component measure would be unreliable and
internally invalid. I believed preference on immigration policy is a better measure than
both forced assimilation (which carries strong cultural, as well as political, overtones) and
whether natives should have preference for jobs (which is a hypothetical situation—i.e.
when jobs are scarce). The question was asked on an ordinal scale, with “1” meaning
that anyone should be allowed to enter the country and “4” meaning that all immigrants
should be prohibited from entering.
10 The only survey that approaches it is the Eurobarometer, due to its semi-annual frequency. However, its
narrow focus on one issue per survey makes the WVS/EVS better suited to my research.
11 To show the differences between the in-group insularity only model and the comprehensive model, the
former was run separately and the r-squared values for the former model are in the appendix.
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Five different explanatory variables comprise the simple in-group insularity part
of the model, rooted in social identity theory.12 The first is an interval-level predictor on
how concerned a respondent is about the lives of immigrants. This accurately reflects
insularity because a respondent who is unconcerned about immigrants likely has a narrow
conception of what views immigrants as unwelcome in the nation-state. It seems logical
that someone who has no concern for immigrants would be amenable to support for anti-
immigrant policies.
The second predictor, to what extent a respondent is prepared to help immigrants
improve their lives in the country, is closely related to the first, it also interesting in that it
captures a different aspect of a respondent’s openness to immigrants. A traditional
national may be concerned on a distant level about immigrants’ lives; he or she may not
be so open to immigrants to help improve their lives, which could mean expanding the in-
group to include immigrants. Like the first predictor, it is an ordinal-level variable asked
on a five-point scale.
The third predictor is level of pride in a respondent’s nationality. This is the
variable that perhaps best measures the extent to which a respondent is insular and view
immigrants as interlopers, because the more proud a respondent is of his or her
nationality, the more likely he or she will view immigrants as unfavorable due to their
out-group status.
The fourth predictor is a whether a respondent thinks it is important to teach
tolerance to children, as those respondents who think it is important are likely more open
to immigrants entering the country. If there is no connection between believing teaching
tolerance is important and opposing anti-immigrant policies, people advocating more
12 Higher scores on the predictors indicate higher levels of insularity unless otherwise explicitly stated.
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open immigration policies may need to make economic, rather than tolerance,
arguments.13
The final predictor for the first part of the model is whether religion is an
important factor when deciding on a spouse. This will hopefully measure the extent to
which a person has true bias toward people who are not part of the dominant Christian
culture.14 This is a valid predictor because there is a strong possibility that the
immigrants were not raised in a Christian culture. A respondent who considers religion
very important when choosing a spouse is less likely to be open to non-Christian
immigrants. As the importance one places on religious beliefs as a part of a marriage
decision increases, there should be more support for anti-immigrant policies.
The second part of the model—which adds perceived economic and demographic
threat rooted in realistic group conflict theory to build a more comprehensive model-- has
four predictors and one control, based mostly on socioeconomic standing.
The first predictor for economic and demographic threat is income level. Those
people who have higher income levels are more likely to have symbolic analyst jobs that
cannot be easily replaced by immigrants (Reich 1991). A higher level of income also
means that a respondent would be less reliant on means-tested poor relief; therefore, they
should perceive less of a threat to their standard of living (both from employment and
welfare provision standpoint) than would someone of lower income.15
13 E.g. “Immigrants are only doing jobs traditional nationals are unwilling to do.”
14 While it would be ideal to test whether a respondent is comfortable with marrying a foreigner and how
that affects anti-immigrant support, the question was not asked in enough European countries to be
included as a predictor, and this question seemed to be the closest proxy.
15 This was initially measured with level of education. However, due to level of education being highly
correlated with tolerance (and thus negatively correlated with in-group insularity), it was replaced by
income level.
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The second predictor is the type of job the respondent has, which follows closely
on the income variable, but gives a more concrete economic threat than income levels.
The reason for this is that, while a higher level of income positions you better generally
in a competitive job market, some types of jobs are simply more likely to be lost to
immigrants in a more concrete sense. Those who are more likely to lose their jobs should
more strongly support anti-immigrant policies The predictor was recoded and collapsed
into three ordinal categories by level of threat to their jobs posed by immigrants.16;17
The third explanatory variable in the economic or demographic threat subgroup
whether a respondent would not like to have immigrants as neighbors. I chose to include
this under the economic or demographic threat subgroup because this builds off V.O.
Key’s racial proximity theory for the American South, which posits that the closer whites
live to a greater number of minorities, the more they will perceive their group interests
being threatened (Key 1949). This variable tests whether this is applicable to Europe. A
respondent saying that he or she would not be comfortable with an immigrant living in
his or her neighborhood should predict for support of anti-immigrant policies.
The fourth explanatory variable is whether a respondent that to maintain order in
a country is the government’s highest priority. This is a key predictor because the debate
over immigration is often framed by anti-immigration activists that immigration will
16 See Table A-2 for precise coding of the variable.
17 I realize the constraints of trying to compress a survey question with thirteen answers into an ordinal
level variable, in this case with only three levels of threat to job security. I also realize that there are some
answers that do not fit very well into any category. However, this was the most comprehensive question
asked in the survey on type of employment, and threat to employment is one of the key indicators of a
perceived economic or demographic threat, so it was essential include this variable. This was the most
nuanced classification I could think of drawing distinctions for which I have no theoretical basis.
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disrupt national security and civil society. Those who are inclined toward preserving
order tend to be warier of immigrants (Adorno et al 1950, Sniderman et al 2002). 
As discussed earlier, the potential for race as a stigmatizing factor may mean that
racial, rather than xenophobic, threat is driving support for anti-immigrant policies.
Thus, a question on race will be a control variable in the full model to determine whether
racist, rather than xenophobic, sympathies drive support for anti-immigrant policies.
The comprehensive model (model 1) is as follows:
Y(i)=1 IMMIGRANT CONCERN(i)+ 2 HELP IMMIGRANTS(i)+ 3
NATIONAL PRIDE(i)+ 4 TOLERANCE IMPORTANT(i)+ 5 RELIGION
IMPORTANT MARRIAGE(i)+ 6 INCOME LEVEL(i)+ 7 TYPE OF JOB(i)+ 8
IMMIGRANT AS NEIGHBOR(i)+ 9 ORDER MOST IMPORTANT(i)+ 10
DIFFERENT RACE NEIGHBOR(i) +(i)
First I will run the model is run across each of the fourteen countries being
examined. Then I will conduct a cross-state analysis, controlling for macro-level
statistical factors that vary across countries but not across respondents within a country.18
These countries all are or will soon be part of the EU and will be competing for the same
finite resources. National governments will be advocating EU policy toward immigrants
in response to state-level statistical factors. Thus, it is important to recognize how being
a resident in a certain country may affect support for anti-immigrant policies.
The first predictor is national birth rate, significant because many countries in
Europe are experiencing a voluntary population decline. Countries with lower birth rates
18 Individual respondents, differentiated by macro-level statistical controls, will still be the unit of analysis.
22
should feel more threatened by immigration, as immigrants would then occupy a larger
proportion of the population than they would if birthrates were near replacement level.
The other predictor in this category is the immigration rate. Countries with higher
rates of immigration should have stronger support for anti-immigrant policies, but a
finding of no relationship would have important implications as well; it would suggest
cognitive dissonance between the perceived and actual rate of immigration.
This cross-national model is as follows:
Y(i)=1 IMMIGRANT CONCERN(i)+ 2 HELP IMMIGRANTS(i)+ 3
NATIONAL PRIDE(i)+ 4 TOLERANCE IMPORTANT(i)+ 5 RELIGION
IMPORTANT MARRIAGE(i)+ 6 INCOME LEVEL(i)+ 7 TYPE OF JOB(i)+ 8
IMMIGRANT AS NEIGHBOR(i)+ 9 ORDER MOST IMPORTANT(i)+ 10
DIFFERENT RACE NEIGHBOR(i) + 11 FERTILITY RATE(i)+ 12 MIGRATION
RATE(i)+ (i)
Results and Discussion
The results for the individual country analyses revealed some expected findings
and some surprising findings. The first significant findings emerge when we compare the
support for immigration restrictions across the countries. The highest scores come from
the three post-communist countries that are geographically in Central Europe—Poland,
the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria all have scores over 2.71 (out of 4.00) on the dependent
variable, whereas in nine of the other eleven countries (France and Great Britain
excluded) the score for the dependent variable did not rise above 2.65. Despite Spain’s
more aggressive anti-immigrant policies, its respondents exhibited by far the lowest
amount of support for immigration restrictions (although Italy was second-lowest).
The higher scores for the post-communist countries may be due to an underlying
security fear about increased illegal immigration due to what respondents perceive as
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their own countries’ insufficient eastern EU border controls, but there was no means of
controlling for this type of security fear in this wave of the EVS/WVS. Hopefully, such a
question will be included in future waves of the study.
Table 1: Support for Anti-Immigrant Policies across Countries Studied
Country Support Score Country Support Score
Austria 2.48 Germany 2.69
Belgium 2.65 Great Britain 2.71
Bulgaria 2.71 Ireland 2.41
Croatia 2.65 Italy 2.35
Czech Republic 2.72 Netherlands 2.56
Finland 2.45 Poland 2.83
France 2.70 Spain 2.05
Note: Support is on 1-4 scale, with higher scores meaning higher support for immigration restrictions.
For the first part of the model—which measures the impact of traditional
nationals’ insularity and lack of openness to foreigners—three of the five predictors were
statistically significant in a majority of the countries studied. In one of the strongest
findings for traditional nationals’ insularity and lack of openness toward immigrants
being the primary cause for support for immigration restrictions, the predictor on level of
concern for immigrants—the most valid predictor of insularity—was statistically
significant in the expected direction in 11 of the 14 countries. In eight of the countries,
the coefficient is greater than 0.1, meaning that someone who is not at all concerned
about immigrants’ lives tends to score 0.4 higher on support for restrictive immigration
policies than someone who is very much concerned.
Also the question as to whether teaching tolerance is important was a statistically
significant predictor in only four of the 14 countries. This finding suggests that not
believing teaching tolerance to be important is an expression of apathy towards
immigrants, rather than a respondent being less open to the possibility of immigrants
24
entering the country. The strongest predictor was to what extent a respondent is prepared
to help immigrants acclimate in their new countries. This is not inconsistent with the
weak predictive power of teaching tolerance, because while many respondents may not
exhibit outright antipathy toward immigrants, these respondents are likely not eager to
make conditions conducive for increased immigration, and this is reflected in the high
regression coefficients.
The coefficients for the in-group insularity part of the Austrian model were more
significant, and in three of the five variables larger, than in the Dutch model. This
suggests that support for anti-immigrant policies in Austria are much more driven by
insularity of traditional nationals and anti-immigrant bias than in the Netherlands.
The results for the second part of the comprehensive model—the variables to
account for realistic group conflict and perceived threat—were mixed. There was an
increase in the adjusted r-squared values in 10 of the 14 countries. The strongest
predictors were whether a respondent believed maintaining order to be the most
important goal for government and whether a respondent would want an immigrant as a
neighbor. The measures were statistically significant at no less than the p<0.05 level, and
in the expected direction, in five and six of the 14 countries studied, respectively. The
race control variable revealed significant results in only four of the fourteen countries—
Germany, Croatia, the Czech Republic and Poland. This finding suggests that it may be
xenophobic, rather than simply racial, concerns that factor into traditional nationals’
support for anti-immigrant policies.
The perceived threat predictors differed only once between France and Great
Britain. Whereas in France, the question of whether a respondent would not like having
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an immigrant as a neighbor was strongly significant, in Great Britain it was insignificant.
This finding, along with their similar high scores on the dependent variable, suggests the
large immigrant populations may have a similar effect in both countries. As expected,
the predictors for economic threat had no significance in Finland or Ireland and very
strong significance in the Czech Republic.
The adjusted r-squared values varied from .059 in Croatia to .241 in France, with
higher values coming from the Western continental countries, and much lower values
coming from Eastern countries in general. This suggests the possibility that the model
may be better suited to Western Europeans than those in the East. A future path of
research may be to design different survey questions that may capture better the
sentiments of Eastern Europeans.
26
Table 2: Analysis of Model 1 In Five Largest and Five Smaller Western European Countries
Variable France Germany Great
Britain
Italy Spain Austria Belgium Finland Ireland Nether-
lands
Immigrant concern .128** .139** .084* .127** .117* .084** .112** .078* .033 .125**
(.027) (.032) (.040) (.029) (.050) (.020) (.026) (.033) (.036) (.038)
Help immigrants .117** .143** .243** .145** .122* .173** .118** .201** .132** .072+
(.028) (.032) (.045) (.033) (.054) (.024) (.025) (.038) (.043) (.041)
Pride in nationality .088** .091** .014 -.050+ .117** . 130** .034 -.014 .117* .068*
(.029) (.026) (.044) (.030) (.053) (.026) (.024) (.043) (.058) (.034)
Teach tolerance imp. .062 -.056 .190* .055 .064 .081* .112* .090 .084 -.031
(.060) (.046) (.023) (.049) (.089) (.042) (.057) (.069) (.071) (.097)
Religion marriage .012 .014 -.009 -.025 .033 .073** -.037 -.006 -.029 .123**
(.025) (.029) (.044) (.027) (.046) (.024) (.026) (.038) (.037) (.045)
Order important .134** .099* N/A .129** .072 -.028 .142** .056 .083 .167**
(.044) (.042) N/A (.046) (.073) (.038) (.042) (.054) (.063) (.053)
Income level .006 .004 .006 .001 -.018 .005 .005 .013 .015 .004
(.010) (.013) (.017) (.007) (.017) (.007) (.008) (.012) (.015) (.013)
Type of job .015 -.008 .010 .001 .040 -.005 .011 .010 .000 .039
(.010) (.012) (.013) (.024) (.047) (.026) (.026) (.034) (.038) (.031)
Immigrant neighbor .216** .272** .131 .263** .106 .336** .279** -.037 .173 .187
(.077) (.078) (.111) (.081) (.142) (.065) (.070) (.096) (.108) (.161)
Diff. race neighbor .115 .234* .191 .085 .155 .064 .121 .048 -.069 .214
(.083) (.100) (.138) (.080) (.130) (.078) (.073) (.097) (.115) (.166)
N 923 885 410 1021 380 1020 1109 635 471 577
Adj. r-squared .242 .184 .220 .140 .094 .224 .187 .110 .053 .112
Root MSE .628 .616 .629 .661 .665 .573 .654 .670 .653 .598
+=Sig. at 0.10 level; *=Sig. at 0.05 level; **=Sig at 0.01 level; two-tailed tests
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Table 3: Analysis of Model 1 In Post-Communist Countries
+=Sig. at 0.10 level; *=Sig at 0.05 level; **=Sig. at 0.01; Two-tailed tests
While there is evidence that a perceived economic threat helps to explain at least
some of the support by traditional nationals for immigration restrictions in some
countries, only in Great Britain is the adjusted r-squared increase larger than .03 over the
in-group insularity only part of the model, and in no country was the r-squared higher
than .241 (France). Some of the predictors, especially on income levels, did a poor job of
predicting support for the dependent variable. This may be due to the fact that people
were asked to self-report their income decile, thus the variable may suffer as a predictor
because many people do not know which decile they fall into. Nonetheless, the weak
Variable Bulgaria Croatia Czech
Rep.
Poland
Immigrant concern .078+ .040 .012 .116**
(.044) (.033) (.020) (.030)
Help immigrants .158** .157** .186** .084**
(.041) (.038) (.026) (.031)
Pride in nationality .075* -.005 .045+ .079+
(.037) (.043) (.024) (.046)
Teaching tolerance
imp.
-.113+ .157 .040 -.020
(.067) (.123) (.036) (.061)
Religion marriage .027 .054 -.012 .122**
(.040) (.042) (.027) (.034)
Order important .073 -.017 .043 -.015
(.076) (.069) (.034) (.049)
Income level .014 .017 .012+ .036**
(.011) (.017) (.006) (.014)
Type of job .041 .068+ .079** .042
(.043) (.035) (.021) (.031)
Immigrant neighbor -.014 .129 .174** .074
(.089) (.099) (.047) (.064)
Diff. race neighbor .053 -.245* .137* .153*
(.085) (.100) (.061) (.073)
N 543 569 1239 866
Adj. r-squared .077 .057 .114 .093
Root MSE .748 .721 .594 .704
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findings with the perceived threat variables included suggests that economic and
demographic concerns, despite being important to most traditional nationals, may not be
complementing in-group insularity and bias toward foreigners in explaining support for
anti-immigrant policies.
Table 4: Cross-National Analysis with Additional Factors19
Variable Variable
Immigrant concern .098** Type of job .012
(.008) (.008)
Help immigrants .157** Immigrant neighbor .196**
(.009) (.022) 
Pride in nationality .043** Diff. race neighbor .070**
(.008) (.024)
Teach tolerance imp. .040* Fertility Rate .116**
(.016) (.027)
Religion marriage .027** Migration Rate -.002
(.009) (.003)
Income level .027**
(.004)
n=10,772; Adj. r-squared=.151; Root MSE=.662
+=Sig at 0.10 level *=Sig. at 0.05 level; **=Sig at 0.01; two-tailed tests
OLS Regression with robust standard errors clustered by country.
Finally, the cross-national regression did not support my hypotheses that there
would be a negative relationship between birthrate and support for restrictions on
immigration, and supported my hypothesis that there would be no relationship between
inward migration rates and support. The latter finding suggests that many Europeans
may believe their countries to have higher immigration rates than is actually the case, and
it may be this perception that drives anti-immigrant policy support, rather than actual
data. The positive relationship between fertility rate and support for restrictions on
immigration was surprising, but further confirms that a perceived demographic threat
probably does not explain support for these restrictions. Rather, it may be that countries
19 Because the question of whether maintaining order is important was not asked in Great Britain, the
question was dropped from the cross-national analysis.
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with higher birth rates may support immigration restrictions because they do not see
immigration as necessary to stop the population decline that many European countries are
experiencing or will experience shortly. However, more research will be necessary to
determine whether this is the case.
Conclusion
Immigration is one of the chief issues facing Europe today, and the recent success
of candidates running on platforms that advocate anti-immigrant policies reflects a deep
unease felt by many traditional nationals over immigration by non-Europeans. Discovery
of why traditional nationals are intolerant toward immigrants has important policy
implications; a perceived economic or demographic threat has vastly different policy
solutions than if the source is primarily traditional nationals’ insularity.
My findings reveal that insularity and lack of openness toward foreigners appears
to be a much stronger predictor of support for anti-immigrant policies than is perceived
economic or demographic threat. This is evidenced by the small increases in r-squared
between the in-group insularity only part of the model and the full model, along with the
fact that the most powerful indicators in the comprehensive model were whether a
respondent expressed concern over immigrants and whether he or she was prepared to
help immigrants become acclimated. These were both in the in-group insularity part of
the model. The fact that support for anti-immigrant policies was positively related to a
country’s fertility rate suggests that the possibility of immigrants as an ever-increasing
proportion of a country’s population is a threat to a tolerant society.
Despite the strong support for these findings, there are other issues that merit
further study. There needs to be better measures for post-communist Europe, given the
low amount of variance explained in the four countries examined compared to their
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Western counterparts. It would be interesting to see whether the explained variance
would increase if comparable but more appropriate questions had been asked to post-
communist respondents. The question about whether a respondent would not feel
comfortable having an immigrant as a spouse needs to be asked in all European countries
to give a better sense of the level of comfort traditional nationals have with immigrants.
Also, if respondents are asked to assess their level of job security—rather than simply the
type of job they had—there may be more of a relationship between level of perceived
threat to job security and support for anti-immigrant policies than the analysis suggests.
As stated earlier, education was dropped from the models due to its high
predictive power for tolerance, raising concerns about multicollinearity. However, it is
clear from earlier iterations of the models that raising the overall levels of education does
reduce support for anti-immigrant policies. Thus, a government promoting policies that
would raise the level of education for most citizens might be the most realistic way to
reduce traditional nationals’ hostility toward immigrants and encourage support for more
liberal immigration policies.
Finally, the finding that economic and demographic threat does not appear to be
the complement in explaining support for anti-immigrant policies presents the puzzle of
whether a complement exists. More research is necessary before this can be ascertained.
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Appendix
Table A-1: Levels of threat for each type of job
Type of Job Threat Level Type of Job Threat Level
Professional workers Low Skilled worker Medium
Foremen/Supervisors Low Never had job Medium
Farmers Low Junior-level non-manual
worker
High
Members of Military Low Semi-skilled manual High
Employee with more
than nine co-workers
Low Unskilled manual High
Employee with fewer
than nine co-workers
Medium Agriculture worker High
Middle-level non-
manual office worker
Medium
Note: Low=1; Medium=2; High=3
Formula for In-group Insularity Only Part of Model 1
Yi=1 IMMIGRANT CONCERN(i)+ 2 HELP IMMIGRANTS(i)+ 3
NATIONAL PRIDE (i)+ 4 TOLERANCE IMPORTANT(i)+ 5
RELIGION IMPORTANT MARRIAGE(i)+ E(i)
Table A-2: Adjusted R-squared values for In-group Insularity Only Part of Model 1
Country R-squared Country R-squared
Austria .182 Germany .161
Belgium .167 Great Britain .165
Bulgaria .070 Ireland .048
Croatia .067 Italy .113
Czech Republic .083 Netherlands .086
Finland .125 Poland .080
France .237 Spain .103
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